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1. Introduction
Trend chasing, switching among different trading strategies and herding are the
most commonly observed boundedly rational behaviors of investors in financial mar-
kets and this paper studies their impact on market volatility. Large fluctuations
in market price, excess volatility in return, and volatility clustering are the most
common stylized facts in financial markets. The question is how differently these
boundedly rational behaviors of investors contribute to market volatility. This paper
introduces a heterogeneous agent asset pricing model in a continuous-time frame-
work to address this question. We show that herding and trend chasing based on
long time horizon increase market volatility in price and return. However, the effect
of switching is different for price volatility and becomes opposite for return volatil-
ity. We also show that these boundedly rational behavior of investors contribute
to the power-law behavior, characterized by insignificant level of autocorrelations
(ACs) in the returns and significant and decaying ACs in the absolute and squared
returns; however, their effects are different. More precisely, the levels of the signifi-
cant ACs in return volatility increase with the herding and trend chasing based on
long time horizon, but increase initially and then decrease as the switching intensity
increases. In general, it is the interaction of nonlinear dynamics and noises that gen-
erates realistic market price dynamics. We show that the market noise plays a more
important role than the fundamental noise in generating the power-law behavior.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper showing that the herding and switching
have opposite effect on the return volatility and different impact on the power-law
behavior.
Over the last three decades, empirical evidence, unconvincing justifications of the
assumption of unbounded rationality and the recognition of the relevance of investor
psychology have led to the incorporation of heterogeneous and boundedly rational
behavior of investors, such as trend chasing, switching and herding, into asset price
and financial market modeling. Cross-sectional and time series momentums based
on trend chasing behavior have been well documented in empirical literature (see
Moskowitz et al. 2012 and the reference cited there), in which the time horizon used
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to calculate the trend plays a very important role in the mechanism generating mo-
mentum profitability (He and Li 2014 and He, Li and Li 2014). Adaptive switching
of agents to better performed strategy can lead to market price fluctuations, bub-
bles and crashes (see for example, Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998 in discrete-time
and He and Li, 2012 in continuous-time). Herding refers broadly to the tendency of
many different agents to take similar actions at roughly the same time. Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) attribute it to the reputational concerns and the unpredictable
components to investment outcomes. Banerjee (1992) shows that herd behavior is
rational in term of obtaining others’ information.
This paper is closely related to the recent development of heterogeneous agent
models (HAMs) in considering financial markets as expectation feedback systems
where asset price fluctuations can be caused by an endogenous mechanism with
heterogeneity and bounded rationality. Various agent-based financial market mod-
els have been developed to incorporate trend chasing, switching and herding. For
instance, by considering two types of traders, typically fundamentalists and trend
followers, Beja and Goldman (1980) and Chiarella (1992) among many others have
shown that interaction of agents with heterogeneous expectations may lead to mar-
ket instability. More significantly, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) introduce the
concept of an adaptively rational equilibrium in a discrete-time framework. Agents
adapt their beliefs over time by choosing from different predictors or expectation
functions based upon their past performance (such as realized profits). Such bound-
edly rational behavior of agents can also lead to market instability. More recently,
these models have been extended to a continuous-time framework (see He et al.
(2009), He and Zheng (2010) and He and Li (2012)), which provides an uniformed
approach in dealing with the effect of time horizon used for trend chasing. Within
a continuous-time framework, Lux (1995) and Alfarano et al. (2008) model the
herding behavior through the master equation and show that herding can give rise
to realistic time series. Within a discrete-time framework, Hohnisch and Westerhoff
(2008) find that herding behavior at the level of individual economic sentiment may
lead to enduring business cycles, while Franke and Westerhoff (2012) show a strong
role for the herding component in generating realistic moments in financial time
4 DI GUILMI, HE AND LI
series. Overall, these models have successfully explained several market features
(such as market booms and crashes, deviations of the market price from the funda-
mental price), the stylized facts (such as skewness, kurtosis, volatility clustering and
fat tails of returns) and the power-law behavior. We refer the reader to Hommes
(2006), LeBaron (2006), Chiarella et al. (2009), Lux (2009), and Chen et al. (2012)
for surveys of the recent development in this literature.
This paper provides a unified framework in a continuous-time model to examine
the joint impact of trend chasing, switching and herding on the market price dynam-
ics and to compare different roles they play in generating market volatility in price
and return and the power-law behavior of stock return volatility. We consider a
continuous-time financial market with two types of agents: the fundamentalists who
trade on the fundamental value and the trend followers who extrapolate the market
price trend based on a weighted moving average price over a finite time horizon.
The herding behavior among the agents is characterized by the master equation.
The market price is determined by a market maker who adjusts the market price
to the excess demand from the fundamentalists and trend followers, together with a
noisy demand. The continuous-time setup chosen in the paper not only mathemat-
ically facilitates modeling the time horizon of the historical price information used
by the trend followers, but also easily accommodates the herding behavior through
the master equation with endogenously determined volatility.
We first examine the dynamics of the underlying deterministic model. Differently
from the adaptive switching model in He and Li (2012), we find that the herding
mechanism does not affect the local stability of the steady state fundamental price,
although it does affect the nonlinear behavior. Based on the analysis of the deter-
ministic dynamics, we then study the joint impact of trend chasing, herding and
switching on the volatility of the market price and returns of the stochastic model.
We find that the trend chasing based on historical prices over a long time horizon
always leads to high volatility in both market prices and stock returns, which is
characterized by the destabilizing effect of the trend chasing. Also, herding and
switching have very different effect on the market volatility. A strong herding con-
tributes to high fluctuation in market fractions and market price and hence generates
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high volatilities in prices and returns, while a more intense switching reduces the re-
turn volatility and has a non-monotonic effect on the volatilities of market fractions
and prices. More interestingly, we observe a “hump” shaped volatility in the market
fraction and an “U”-shaped price volatility as the switching intensity increases.
We explore further the potential of the model to generate the power-law be-
havior in volatility by examining the impact of the different noises (including the
fundamental noise, the market noise and the market fraction noise), time horizon,
switching and herding on the level of ACs of the returns, absolute returns, and
squared returns. We find that market noise is the main driving force in generating
the power-law behavior. The levels of the AC patterns become more significant as
the time horizon and herding increase, but non-monotonically with the switching.
Specifically, an initial increase in the switching intensity leads to an increase in the
significant levels of ACs, but the ACs decrease as the switching increases further.
In general, it is the combination of switching and herding, together with the market
noise, that generates realistic power-law behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce a stochastic HAM of asset
pricing in continuous-time with trend chasing, herding, switching and heterogeneous
beliefs in Section 2. In Section 3, we apply stability and bifurcation theory of delay
differential equations, together with numerical analysis of the nonlinear system,
to examine the impact of herding, switching and time horizon used by the trend
followers on market stability. The effect of and different roles played by trend
chasing, herding and switching on the market volatility and power-law behavior
are then discussed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes. All proofs
and some additional results are given in the Appendices.
2. The Model
Consider a financial market with a risky asset (such as stock market index) and
let P (t) be the (cum dividend) price of the risky asset at time t. Following the
standard approach of HAMs (see, for example, Brock and Hommes (1998)), we
assume that the market consists of fundamentalists, who trade according to the
fundamental value of the risky asset, trend followers, who trade based on price
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trend of a weighted moving averages of historical prices over a time horizon, and a
market maker, who clears the market by providing liquidity. The behavior of the
fundamentalists and trend followers is modeled as usual. Different from the discrete-
time HAMs in the literature (for example, Chiarella and He, 2002 and 2003), we
consider a continuous-time setup to accommodate different time horizon used by
the trend followers and the stochastic master equation characterizing the herding
behavior of agents. For completeness, we introduce the demand functions of the
fundamentalists and the trend followers briefly and refer the reader to He and Li
(2012) (HL model hereafter) for details.
The fundamentalists believe that the market price P (t) is mean-reverting to the
fundamental value F (t) that can be estimated based on fundamental analysis. They
buy (sell) the stock when the current price P (t) is below (above) the fundamental
value F (t). For simplicity, we assume that the demand of the fundamentalists,
Zf(t) at time t, is proportional to the deviation of the market price P (t) from the
fundamental value F (t), namely,
Zf(t) = βf [F (t)− P (t)], (2.1)
where βf > 0 is a constant, measuring the speed of mean-reversion of the market
price to the fundamental value, weighted by the risk tolerance of the fundamentalists.





σ2FF (t)dt+ σFF (t)dWF (t), F (0) = F̄ , (2.2)




= σF dWF (t) is
a pure white noise process following a normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation
of σF
√
dt. This implies that any non-normality and volatility clustering of market returns that
generated by the model are not carried from the fundamental returns. In the present treatment
we use the zero-mean fundamental return process (2.2). Suggested by the referee, we have also
investigated the case of positive drift in the fundamental return process: d(lnF (t)) = µFdt +
σFdWF (t) with µF = cσ
2
F > 0 for a constant c. Numerical simulations show this does not alter the
effects of time horizon, herding and switching on the volatilities and autocorrelations documented
in Sections 4 and 5, although an increase in µF reduces the level of return volatility and makes the
autocorrelations decay slower.
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where σF > 0 represents the volatility of the fundamental return and WF (t) is a
standard Wiener process.
The trend followers believe that the future market price follows a price trend u(t).
When the current price is above (below) the trend, the trend followers believe that
the price will rise (fall) and hold a long (short) position of the risky asset. We






The S-shaped hyperbolic demand function capturing the trend following behavior
is well documented in the HAM literature (see, for example, Chiarella et al. 2009),
where the parameter βc represents the extrapolation rate of the trend followers
on the future price trend. The limited position may reflect the wealth constraint
or the cautiousness of the trend followers when the price deviates from the trend
significantly2. Among various estimators of the price trend used in practice, we
assume that the price trend u(t) at time t is calculated by an exponentially decaying







where time delay τ ∈ [0,∞) represents a time horizon used to calculate the price
trend and k > 0 is a decay rate. Equation (2.4) implies that, when forming the
price trend, the trend followers believe that the more recent prices contain more
information about the future price movement so that the weights associated to the
historical prices decay exponentially. In particular, when k → 0, the price trend








2Alternative to (2.1), one can assume that the fundamentalists also take limited positions as
the trend followers, Zf (t) = tanh
[
βf (F (t) − P (t))
]
. Clearly this assumption does not affect
the local stability of the fundamental price. Intuitively, because of the stabilizing role of the
fundamentalists, this limited position will make the market price less stable. This is supported by
numerical simulations (not reported here) showing that the fluctuations are amplified when the
system become unstable.
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When k → ∞, all the weights go to the current price so that u(t) → P (t). For the
time delay, when τ → 0, the trend followers regard the current price as the price







In general, for 0 < k, τ < ∞, equation (2.4) can be expressed as a delay differential





P (t)− e−kτP (t− τ)− (1− e−kτ )u(t)
]
dt. (2.7)
Let Nf(t) and Nc(t) be the numbers of the fundamentalists and trend followers,
respectively, at time t, satisfying Nf(t)+Nc(t) = N , a constant. Denote by nf(t) =
Nf(t)/N and nc(t) = Nc(t)/N the market fractions of the fundamentalists and
trend followers, respectively. The net profits of the fundamental and trend following
strategies over a small time interval [t, t+ dt] are then measured by, respectively,
πf (t)dt = Zf(t)dP (t)− Cfdt, πc(t)dt = Zc(t)dP (t)− Ccdt, (2.8)
where Cf , Cc ≥ 0 are constant costs of the strategies per time unit. The perfor-
mances of the strategies are measured by the cumulated and weighted net profits






e−ηi(t−s)πi(s)ds, i = f, c, (2.9)
where ηi > 0 and τi > 0 for i = f, c represent the decay parameter and time horizon





1− e−ηiτi − Ui(t)
]
dt, i = f, c. (2.10)
Denote by a(t) the transition probability of an agent switching from trend follower
to fundamentalist and by b(t) the probability of the inverse transition. Following
Lux (1995), the probabilities can be quantified by
a(t) = veβ(Uf (t)−Uc(t)), b(t) = veβ(Uc(t)−Uf (t)), (2.11)
3The investment time horizon can be different for the fundamentalists and trend followers and
therefore they may use different time horizon when evaluating the performance of their strategies.
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where β measures the switching intensity and v > 0 captures the intensity of herding
(explained in the following). Let ζ(t) denote the transition rate of observing a change
of an agent from trend follower to fundamentalist and ξ(t) denote the transition
rate of recording the opposite transition. Both ζ(t) and ξ(t) are assumed to be
proportional to the transition probability of the switching and the corresponding
market fractions to capture the herding behavior. Then the transition rates can be
expressed as
ζ(t) = (1− nf (t))a(t) = v(1− nf (t))eβ(Uf (t)−Uc(t)), (2.12)
ξ(t) = nf(t)b(t) = vnf(t)e
β(Uc(t)−Uf (t)). (2.13)
Note that, when β = 0, a large v means a strong herding among the agents. Here-
after, we use β and v to measure the (performance based) switching and herding, re-
spectively, among the agents. Following Lux (1995), the master equation measuring
the variation of probability in a unit of time by taking the number of fundamentalists
as a state variable follows
dp(Nf , t)
dt
= ζ(t)p(Nf − 1, t) + ξ(t)p(Nf + 1, t)− [ζ(t) + ξ(t)]p(Nf , t), (2.14)
where p(Nf , t) is the probability of recording a number of Nf fundamentalists at
time t. Following Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011b), the dynamics of the population
evolution can be characterized by4







andWnf (t) is the stochastic fluctuation component in the market population fraction
of fundamentalists, which is assumed to be independent from the fundamental noises
WF (t).
Finally, the price P (t) at time t is adjusted by the market maker according to the
aggregate market excess demand, that is,
dP (t) = µ
[
nf(t)Zf (t) + nc(t)Zc(t)
]
dt+ σMdWM(t),
4The derivation is given in Appendix A.
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where µ > 0 represents the speed of the price adjustment by the market maker,
σM > 0 is a constant and WM(t) is a standard Wiener process capturing the random
excess demand process either driven by unexpected market news or noise traders,5
which is independent of WF (t) and Wnf (t).
To sum up, the market price of the risky asset is determined according to the


















P (t)− e−kτP (t− τ)− (1− e−kτ)u(t)
]
dt,

























σ2FF (t)dt+ σFF (t)dWF (t),
(2.17)
where Zf (t) and Zc(t) are defined by (2.1) and (2.3), respectively, and πi(t) is de-
fined by (2.8) for i = f, c. The stochastic differential system (2.17) characterizes
the market price dynamics with heterogeneity in trading strategies, trend chasing,
switching and herding. The main difference between the system (2.17) and the HL
model is that the population evolution is characterized through the replicator dy-
namics in the HL model, instead of the master equation on herding in system (2.17)
and therefore the dynamics of market fraction nf is specified with endogenously
determined volatility. The other processes (P, u, Uf , Uc, F ) are the same for the two
systems.
In the following sections, we first conduct a stability analysis of the underlying
deterministic model. Then we examine the impact of the interaction of the de-
terministic dynamics with the noises on the fluctuations of the market population
5The additive noise comes naturally when a demand from noise traders is introduced into the
aggregated excess demand function.
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fractions (of using different strategies) and market volatility in both prices and re-
turn. Furthermore, we explore the power-law behavior in volatility.
3. The Stability Analysis of the Deterministic Model
To understand the interaction of the nonlinear deterministic dynamics and the
noise processes, we first study the local stability of the corresponding deterministic
system. By assuming σM = 0 and hence F (t) = F̄ and considering the mean process































































− Ci, i = f, c.
The system has a steady state6




in which the market price is given by the fundamental value. We call Q the fun-
damental steady state of the system (3.1). At the fundamental steady state, the




. When Cf = Cc,
n∗f = n
∗
c = 0.5, meaning that the market fractions at the fundamental steady state
is independent from the switching intensity β and the herding parameter v. However,





6In addition, the line P = u, nf = 0, Uf = −Cf , Uc = −Cc is a steady state line of the
system. This means that the system has infinite many steady states. Near the line, the solution
with different initial values converge to different steady states on the line. Hence the line is locally
attractive. A similar result is found in He et al. (2009) and He and Zheng (2010).
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that there are more trend followers than fundamentalists at the fundamental steady
state.
Denote γf = µn
∗
fβf and γc = µ(1 − n∗f )βc. The local stability and bifurcation
of the fundamental steady state with respect to the time delay of system (3.1) are
summarized in the following proposition7.
Proposition 3.1. There exist τ0 and τ̃ with 0 < τ0 < τ̃ such that the fundamental
steady state Q of system (3.1) is
(i) asymptotically stable for τ ∈ [0, τ0);
(ii) asymptotically stable for τ > τ̃ when γf + k > γc;
(iii) unstable for τ > τ̃ when γf + k < γc.
In addition, system (3.1) undergoes Hopf bifurcations at the zero solutions of func-
tions S±n (τ).
Note that the conditions in (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3.1 are sufficient but not
necessary. Specifically, the stability for the case τ0 < τ < τ̃ is completely determined
by the functions S±n (τ) and the system may switch between stability and instabil-
ity for many times for τ ∈ (τ0, τ̃). We refer to Theorem 3.3 in He et al. (2009)
for the properties of functions S±n (τ). Proposition 3.1 implies that the fundamen-
tal steady state is stable for either small or large time delay when the market is
dominated by the fundamentalists (in the sense of γf + k > γc). Otherwise, when
the trend followers become more active comparing to the fundamentalists (in the
sense of γc > γf + k), the fundamental steady state becomes unstable through Hopf
bifurcations as the time delay increases. However, the effect of an increase in k, cor-
risponding to a larger weight of the most recent historical prices for trend followers,
the fundamental price is stabilized. In the extreme case of k → ∞, the price trend is
given by current price. In this case, the demand of the trend followers (2.3) becomes
zero and hence the system (3.1) becomes globally stable. This is consistent with the
discrete-time HAMs, as the one by Chiarella, Dieci, He and Li (2013), which demon-
strate that a decrease in the decay rate destabilizes the system. In line with the
7The definitions of parameters τ0, τ̃ , functions S
±
n (τ) and the proof of Proposition 3.1 are given
in Appendix B.
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discrete-time HAMs, when the time horizon is small, the insignificant price trend,
resulting in weak trading signals for the trend followers, limits the destabilizing ac-
tivity of the chartists. Consequently, the fundamentalists dominate the market and
the market price is stabilized to the fundamental value. However, Proposition 3.1
also indicates a very interesting phenomenon of the continuous-time model that is
not easy to obtain in discrete-time models, which is the stability switching when the
fundamentalists dominate the market8. That is, the system becomes unstable as
the time delay increases initially, but the stability can be recovered when the time
delay becomes large enough. Intuitively, when time horizon is small, the price trend
becomes less significant, which limits the destabilizing effort of the trend followers.
As the time horizon increases, the price trend becomes more sensitive to the changes
in market price and consequently the trend followers become more active and desta-
bilize the market. However, as the time horizon becomes very large, the price trend
becomes smooth and less sensitive to price changes. Therefore the trend followers
become less active and then, because of the dominance of the fundamentalists, the
market becomes stable.
(a) Price bifurcation in τ (b) Price bifurcation in β









(c) Phase plot of Uf and nf
Figure 3.1. (a) The bifurcation of the market prices with respect
to τ with β = 1; (b) The bifurcation of market price with respect to
β with τ = 8.3; (c) The phase plot of the relationship between the
fitness Uf and the market fraction nf with τ = 16 and β = 1.
8This phenomenon is also observed in the continuous-time model in He et al. (2009), He and
Zheng (2010), and He and Li (2012).
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The simulation results of the nonlinear model (3.1) in Fig. 3.1 verify the stability
results in Proposition 3.19. Fig. 3.1 (a) plots the bifurcation diagram of the market
price with respect to τ , showing that the fundamental steady state is stable for τ ∈
[0, τ0) ∪ (τ1,∞) and Hopf bifurcations occur at τ = τ0 ≈ 8.5 and τ = τ1 ≈ 27. This
refers to the case that the market is dominated by fundamentalists. Fig. 3.1 (b) plots
the price bifurcation diagram with respect to the switching intensity parameter β. It
shows that the steady state fundamental price is stable when the switching intensity
β is low, but becomes unstable as the switching intensity increases, bifurcating to
stable periodic price with increasing fluctuations. This result shares the same spirit
of the rational routes to complicated price dynamics in the discrete-time framework
by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). Fig. 3.1 (c) illustrates the phase plot of
(Uf , nf), showing the positive relation between the fitness Uf and the market fraction
nf .
We also examine the impact of the different parameters on the stability. Propo-
sition 3.1 shows that the decay rate k plays a stabilizing role and simulations (not
reported here) show that an increasing in k narrows the instability interval by in-
creasing the first bifurcation value and decreasing the second bifurcation value. Sim-
ulations also show that the system is always stable for all time horizons when µ is
small but becomes unstable as µ increases. However, once the system becomes un-
stable, the stability seems insensitive to any further increase in µ. The system can
be stabilized by increasing βf and Cc, or decreasing βc, Cf and β. Proposition 3.1
shows that ηf , ηc, τf , τc cannot affect the local stability and simulations show that
their impact on the nonlinear system is very limited.
Fig. 3.2 provides further insights into the nonlinear dynamics of the market price
and market fraction of the fundamentalists for τ = 16 when the fundamental steady
state is unstable. Fig. 3.2 (a) illustrates the time series of the market prices P (t)
and the market fraction nf(t) of fundamentalists. It shows that the market fractions
9Unless specified otherwise, the following set of parameters are used in all the simulations in
this paper: k = 0.05, µ = 1, βf = 1.4, βc = 1.4, β = 1, Cf = 0.05, Cc = 0.03, ηf = 0.5, ηc = 0.6, τ =
16, τf = 10, τc = 5, v = 0.5 and F̄ = 1. Note that the fundamentalists generally focus on long-run
performance but the trend followers focus on short-run performance. So we choose τf > τc and
correspondingly ηf < ηc.
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(a) Time series of P and nf








(b) Phase plot of (P, nf )
Figure 3.2. (a) The time series of the market prices P (t) (the blue
solid line) and the market fraction nf (t) of fundamentalists (the green
dash dot line) and (b) the phase plot of (P (t), nf(t)). Here τ = 16.
fluctuate with the market price. Fig. 3.2 (b) presents the phase plot of (P (t), nf(t))
showing that the price and fraction converge to a figure-eight shaped attractor, a
phenomenon also observed in the discrete-time model by Chiarella et al (2006).
Interestingly, the herding parameter v does not affect the local stability of the
fundamental price and the deterministic price dynamics are very similar to the
results in HL model without herding. For illustration, we compare this model with
the HL model. In Appendix C, corresponding to Figs. 3.1 and 3.2, we present
Figs. C.1 and C.2, respectively, for the HL model. It is observed that both models
exhibit similar deterministic dynamics in price and market fraction. However, the
nonlinear dynamics can be affected by the herding parameter v. Comparing Fig.
3.2 with v = 0.5 and Fig. C.3 with v = 0.1 in Appendix C, we observe that, when
the herding behavior among agents is not very strong (as indicated by a decrease
in the parameter v), the fluctuations of market price and, in particular, the market
fractions of the fundamentalists are reduced. In other words, a strong herding among
agents contributes to high fluctuations in market fractions, which then result in high
volatility in market prices. This effect is further examined for the stochastic model
in the next section.
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4. Price Behavior of the Stochastic Model
In this section, through numerical simulations, we examine the price dynamics
of the stochastic model by focusing on the impact of three parameters: the time
horizon τ , the intensity of herding v, the switching intensity β and the two noisy
processes characterized by σF and σM , on market volatility in both price and return.
The analysis provides further insights into the different roles played by herding and
switching in financial markets.

















(a) Prices for τ = 3

















(b) Prices for τ = 16













(c) Price deviation density for τ = 3













(d) Price deviation density for τ = 16
Figure 4.1. The time series of the fundamental price F (t) (the blue
dotted line) and the market prices P (t) (the red solid line) with (a)
τ = 3 and (b) τ = 16, and the distributions of the deviations of the
market prices from the fundamental prices P (t)−F (t) with (c) τ = 3
and (d) τ = 16. Here σF = 0.12 and σM = 0.15.
We first explore the interaction between the underlying deterministic dynamics
and the two noisy processes by choosing two different values of the time horizon. For
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the deterministic model (3.1), Fig. 3.1 (a) shows that the time horizon can affect
the stability of the fundamental price. In particular, the fundamental steady state
is stable for τ = 3 and unstable for τ = 16, leading to periodic fluctuations of the
market price. For the stochastic model, we choose the volatility of the fundamental
price σF = 0.12 and the volatility of the market noise σM = 0.15
10. With the same
random draws of the fundamental price and market noise processes, we plot the
fundamental price (the blue dotted line) and the market prices (the red solid line) in
Fig. 4.1 for the two different values of τ under the same set of parameters for Fig. 3.1
(a). For τ = 3 and τ = 16, Figs. 4.1 (a) and (b) show that the market prices fluctuate
around the fundamental prices and the fluctuations for τ = 16 are significantly larger
than that for τ = 3. This observation is further supported by the distribution plots
of the deviations of the market prices from the fundamental prices P (t) − F (t) in
Fig. 4.1 (c) for τ = 3 and in Fig. 4.1 (d) for τ = 16. With the standard deviations
of 0.8158 for τ = 3 and 1.2091 for τ = 16, the deviations are more spread for
τ = 16. This is partially underlined by the change in the stability of the underlying
deterministic dynamics. Further simulations (not reported here) show that when
the time horizon increases further to the stabilizing range indicated by Fig. 3.1 (a),
the fluctuations of the market price deviations from the fundamental price become
even more significant. This result illustrates that, when the underlying deterministic
dynamics are stable, the stochastic dynamics can become very unstable with large
fluctuations in price deviations due to a slow convergence of the market price to the
fundamental price of the underlying deterministic model and its interaction with the
fundamental and market noises. Therefore, an increase in time horizon increases the
deviations of the market price from the fundamental price and the fluctuations of
the market price.
To examine the effect of herding, with the same parameters and random draws,
Fig. D.1 in Appendix D illustrates the corresponding results of the HL model
without herding. It displays similar price patterns but with less significant deviations
10The constraint nf (t) ∈ [0, 1] is imposed when simulating the stochastic system. In all the
simulations, the time unit is one year and the time step corresponds to one day. Unless specified
otherwise, an annual volatility of σF = 0.12 and a market noise volatility of σM = 0.15 are used
in the paper.
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in prices (with the standard deviations of 0.2477 for τ = 3 and 0.4703 for τ = 16).
The comparison implies that the herding behavior contributes to the excess volatility
of the market price, a higher acceleration to market highs and lows, and a quicker
mean reversion to the fundamental price.















(a) Market fraction for τ = 3















(b) Market fraction for τ = 16











(c) Market fraction density for τ = 3











(d) Market fraction density for τ = 16
Figure 4.2. The time series of the fractions of the fundamentalists
with (a) τ = 3 and (b) τ = 16 and the corresponding distributions
with (c) τ = 3 and (d) τ = 16. Here σF = 0.12 and σM = 0.15.
We also plot the corresponding time series and distributions of the market frac-
tions of the fundamentalists in Fig. 4.2 for both τ = 3 (the left panel) and τ = 16
(the right panel). Comparing to Fig. D.2 in Appendix D for the HL model (with
switching but without herding), we have two observations. (i) In the presence of
herding, the market fractions fluctuate wildly between 0 and 1 and are almost uni-
formly distributed except for the spike near 0, as shown in Fig. 4.2. However, with-
out herding, the market fractions fluctuate around the steady state (nf = 0.495) in a
small range (from 35% to 75%), illustrated by both the time series and distribution
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plots in Fig. D.2. This implies that the herding effect dominates the switching effect
in generating high fluctuations in the market fractions. (ii) For the market fraction,
by comparing the time series and distributions in Fig. 4.2 for τ = 3 (the left panel)
and τ = 16 (the right panel), the effect of the time horizon is not highly significant.
However, as indicated by the small peak near 1 for τ = 16 in Fig. 4.2 (d), the time
horizon does affect the market fractions. In general we observe that herding leads
to the dominance of the trend followers in the market, while an increase in the time
horizon reduces the dominance of the trend followers and increases the dominance
of the fundamentalists.
One of the innovative features of the model is that the market fraction is deter-
mined by the master equation (2.15) with endogenous volatility (2.16). Because of
the dependence of the transition rates on the time horizon τ , the switching β and
herding v, the volatility also depends on τ, β and v. Therefore the variations in the
market fractions can affect the deviation of the market price from the fundamental
price and return volatility. In general, the impact on market volatility can be differ-
ent for price and return. In order to provide further insights into the different roles
of herding, switching and time horizon on the fluctuations of the market fractions
and the market volatility, we perform a separate sensitivity analysis for each of the
three parameters τ, v and β by keeping the others at their benchmark values. In
each case, we examine the impact on the endogenously determined volatility of the
market fractions (of the fundamentalists), σnf , the volatility of the price deviations,
σ(P − F ), and the volatility of the market returns, σ(r). Based on the common
set of the parameters, we run 100 simulations for each parameter combination and
plot the averages of σnf , σ(P −F ) and σ(r) and denote by σ̄nf , σ̄(P −F ) and σ̄(r),
respectively.
4.1. The effect of the time horizon. For τ ∈ [0, 20], we conduct Monte Carlo
simulations and plot σ̄nf , σ̄(P − F ) and σ̄(r) in the upper panel for β = 0.1, 1, 2
and the lower panel for v = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 in Fig. 4.3, from which we can draw two
observations about the volatility.
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(i) All the volatilities, in terms of σ̄nf , σ̄(P − F ) and σ̄(r), increase as the time
horizon and herding increase11. For τ = 0, the trend followers are not participating
in the market and the lower volatilities simply reflect the resulting volatilities of the
market noise and fundamental noise. In this case, herding plays no role in market
volatility in both the price and return (as indicated by the constant volatility for
various β and v when τ = 0 in the middle and right panels). As τ increases, all the
volatilities increase significantly. This effect becomes less significant for the market
fraction volatility σ̄nf after an initial increase in τ (from 0 to about 5). The increase
of the price deviation volatility in the time horizon is underlined by the destabilizing
effect of τ on the underlying deterministic dynamics. Because of the fluctuations in
the market fractions, we observe an increase in the return volatility as well. We also
observe the same effect as the herding parameter v increases in the low panel of Fig.
4.3. Due to the independence of the local stability from the intensity of herding,
this result is more a consequence of the interaction of nonlinearity and noises.
(ii) Switching has a non-monotonic impact on the volatilities of market fraction
and market price, but reduces the return volatility as the switching intensity in-
creases. Figs. 4.3 (a) and (b) show that the volatilities of market fraction and
market price deviations are non-monotonic as β increases. An initial increase in β
leads to an increase in the volatility of market fraction but the effect reverses as
β increases further, implying a “hump” shaped effect on the volatilities of market
fraction. However, we also observe an “U”-shaped effect on the volatility of the price
deviations. This non-monotonic feature is explored further in the discussion below.
Furthermore, Fig. 4.3 (c) shows that the volatilities of market return decrease in β,
an opposite effect to herding. Such different impact of the switching and herding
on volatility of price and return has not been explored in the literature. This pro-
vides some insights into the distinct role played by switching and herding in market
volatility. If one argues that the switching behavior is more rational than the herd-
ing one, this result then indicates that herding can increase the return volatility,
while switching can reduce the return volatility.
11Except σ̄nf for large β that the volatility seems to decrease as time horizon increases. This is
related to the non-monotonic impact of β on the volatilities illustrated in Fig. 4.5.
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(a) σ̄nf in τ and β



















(b) σ̄(P − F ) in τ and β
















(c) σ̄(r) in τ and β

















(d) σ̄nf in τ and v























(e) σ̄(P − F ) in τ and v



















(f) σ̄(r) in τ and v
Figure 4.3. The average variations of market fraction volatility σ̄nf
(a) and (d), price deviation volatility σ̄(P−F ) (b) and (e), and return
volatility σ̄(r) (c) and (f) with β = 0.1, 1, 2 (and v = 0.5) in the
upper panel and v = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 (and β = 1) in the lower panel,
respectively, with respect to time horizon τ ∈ [0, 20].
4.2. The effect of the herding. For v ∈ [0, 1], we plot σ̄nf , σ̄(P − F ) and σ̄(r)
for τ = 0, 3, 16 in the upper panel and for β = 0.1, 1, 2 in the lower panel in Fig.
4.4 based on Monte Carlo simulations. It provides consistent observations as in the
previous case. When the herding parameter v and the time horizon τ increase, all
the volatilities increase. However an increase in the switching parameter reduces
the average volatility of return, as illustrated in Fig. 4.4 (f). Also Figs. 4.4 (d)
and (e) show that the switching has a non-monotonic impact on the volatilities of
market fraction and price. Consistently with the previous observations, the herding
increases the fluctuations of the market price from the fundamental price and return.
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(a) σ̄nf in v and τ





















(b) σ̄(P − F ) in v and τ
















(c) σ̄(r) in v and τ
















(d) σ̄nf in v and β



















(e) σ̄(P − F ) in v and β













(f) σ̄(r) in v and β
Figure 4.4. The average variations of market fraction volatility σ̄nf
(a) and (d), price deviation volatility σ̄(P−F ) (b) and (e), and return
volatility σ̄(r) (c) and (f) with τ = 0, 3, 16 (and β = 1) in the upper
panel and β = 0.1, 1, 2 (and τ = 16) in the lower panel, respectively,
with respect to v ∈ [0, 1].
4.3. The effect of switching. For β ∈ [0, 2], we plot σ̄nf , σ̄(P − F ) and σ̄(r) for
τ = 0, 3, 8, 16 in the upper panel and for v = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 in the lower panel in Fig.
4.5 based on Monte Carlo simulations. When β = 0, the market fractions are driven
purely by the herding behavior. In general, we observe consistent results in terms of
the impact of time horizon and herding obtained in the previous two cases. However,
there is a significantly non-monotonic relationship between the volatilities and the
switching intensity β. We observe a “hump” shaped volatility in the market fraction
(in Figs. 4.5 (a) and (d)), an “U”-shaped price volatility (in Figs. 4.5 (b) and (e)),
and a decreasing volatility in returns (in Figs. 4.5 (c) and (f)) as the switching
parameter β increases. Interestingly, an initial increase in the switching leads to
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(a) σ̄nf in β and τ






















(b) σ̄(P − F ) in β and τ

















(c) σ̄(r) in β and τ
















(d) σ̄nf in β and v




















(e) σ̄(P − F ) in β and v













(f) σ̄(r) in β and v
Figure 4.5. The average variations of market fraction volatility σ̄nf
(a) and (d), price deviation volatility σ̄(P−F ) (b) and (e), and return
volatility σ̄(r) (c) and (f) with τ = 0, 3, 16 (and v = 0.5) in the
upper panel and v = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 (and τ = 16) in the lower panel,
respectively, with respect to β ∈ [0, 1].
higher market fraction volatility and lower market price volatility, following by the
decreasing volatility in fractions and the increasing volatility in price deviations when
β increases beyond certain threshold value. This result explains the phenomenon in
Fig. 4.3 (a) that for large β, an increase in the time horizon τ leads to an initial
increase in the market fraction volatility, but a dramatic decline when τ increases
further. It also implies that large fluctuations in the market fractions reduce the
market price deviation from the fundamental price when the switching intensity is
low, but the effect becomes opposite when the switching intensity is high. However,
a large intensity of switching always reduces return volatility. Therefore, we can
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have a market with high fluctuations in the market price and low volatility in the
returns at the same time.
In summary, the impact on the volatility can be very different for price and
returns. The trend chasing over a long time horizon and herding always lead to high
volatility. However the switching and herding behaviors have an opposite effect
on the market returns volatility. Although the switching has significant and non-
monotonic impact on the market volatility, it can actually reduce return volatility.
This analysis explains the different effect of herding and switching mechanisms on
the volatilities in price and returns.
5. Power-law Behavior in Volatility
After exploring the impact of the time horizon, herding, and switching on market
volatility in the previous section, we are now interested in their impact on the power-
law behavior in volatility. It has been well explored in the HAM literature that it is
the interaction of the nonlinear dynamics of the underlying deterministic model and
the noises that generate the power-law behavior. Both the switching and the herding
mechanisms have been explored, but a comparison of different mechanism is missing
in the literature. This section is devoted to such a comparison. We first examine
the impact of the noises and then of the time horizon, switching and herding on the
ACs of the returns, absolute returns, and squared returns with the two noises.
To motivate the analysis, we first present the ACs of the returns, absolute re-
turns, and squared returns for market daily closing price indices of the DAX 30,
the FTSE 100, the NIKKEI 225, and the S&P 500 from 01/02/1984 to 31/07/2013
from Datastream in Fig. 5.1. Note that the levels of all the ACs for the returns are
not significant, but they are significant and decaying for the absolute and squared
returns. This phenomenon is referred as the power-law behavior or long memory in
market volatility in empirical literature, see He and Li (2007) and references cited
there.
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Figure 5.1. The ACs of the returns (the bottom lines), the squared
returns (the middle lines) and the absolute returns (the upper lines)
for (a) the DAX 30, (b) the FTSE 100, (c) the NIKKEI 225, and (d)
the S&P 500.
5.1. The effect of the noises. For the two exogenously given fundamental and
market noises, we examine the impact of the noises by considering three combina-
tions of (i) both the fundamental and market noises; (ii) the market noise only; and
(iii) the fundamental noise only.
We first consider the effect of the fundamental and market noises with σF = 0.12
and σM = 0.15. Fig. E.1 in Appendix E represents the results of a typical simulation
based on the same set of parameters in Fig. 4.1 with τ = 16. The results demonstrate
that the stochastic model established in this paper is able to generate market price
deviations from the fundamental value (in Fig. E.1 (a)), most of the stylized facts
observed in financial markets (including volatility clustering in Fig. E.1 (b), high
kurtosis in in Fig. E.1 (c)), and the power-law behavior in volatility (insignificant
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autocorrelation (AC) levels for returns in Fig. E.1 (d), but significant decaying AC
levels for the absolute returns and the squared returns in Figs. E.1 (e) and (f)).
Next we consider the effect of the market noise. With the same parameters and
random seeds, Fig. E.2 in Appendix E shows that the model is able to generate a
similar result to the previous case with the two noises, although the levels of the
significant ACs are lower. This implies that, even with a constant fundamental
value, the model has a great potential in generating the power-law behavior. This
result is significantly different from the switching HL model, in which the model is
not able to generate the power-law behavior without fundamental noise.
Finally, we consider the effect of the fundamental noise. Fig. E.3 in Appendix
E shows that the model is not able to generate the volatility clustering and the
power-law behavior, which is consistent with the HL model. Meanwhile the market
returns, absolute returns and squared returns exhibit highly significant ACs with
strong decaying patterns, which is mainly due to the strong effect of the deterministic
dynamics of the price process.


















(a) The ACs of the absolute returns





















(b) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure 5.2. The effect of the fundamental noise: the ACs of (a) the
absolute returns and (b) the squared returns based on 100 simulations
with τ = 16, v = 0.5 for σF = 0.12 (the red solid line) and σF = 0
(the blue dash-dotted line).
To further investigate the effect of the fundamental noise on the AC patterns, Fig.
5.2 compares the ACs of the absolute returns and the squared returns for σF = 0.12
(the red solid line) and σF = 0 (the blue dash-dotted line) based on 100 simulations.
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The ACs of the absolute returns and squared returns are significant and decaying.
However, with the market noise σF = 0.12, the ACs decay quickly than those for
σF = 0. This indicates that the market noise plays a key role in generating the
power-law behavior, though it is not the only factor, as argued in He and Li (2007).
The previous analysis on the effect of the time horizon, switching, and herding
shows that they play different roles in generating volatility in market price and
return. We now further investigate their effect on the power-law behavior. Similarly,
we consider three cases, each focuses on one of the three parameters τ, v and β. For
each case, we examine the impact on the AC patterns of the absolute and squared
returns. Based on the common set of the parameters, we run 100 simulations for
each parameter combination and plot the average ACs for the absolute and squared
returns.12



















(a) The ACs of the absolute returns
















(b) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure 5.3. The effect of the time horizon: the ACs of (a) the ab-
solute returns and (b) the squared returns based on 100 simulations
with v = 0.5, β = 1, σF = 0.12, σM = 0.15 for τ = 0, τ = 3 and
τ = 16.
5.2. The effect of the time horizon. First, we present in Fig. 5.3 the effect of
the time horizon on the AC patterns for the absolute returns (the left panel) and
the squared returns (the right panel). We observe that the trend chasing based on
different time horizons contributes to the significant decaying AC patters for both
the absolute and squared returns. Also the significant levels of the ACs increase
12The average AC levels for the returns are insignificant in all three cases reported.
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as the time horizon increases, in particular, when the time horizon is large. This
suggests that a commonly observed slow decaying AC patterns in the discrete-time
HAM literature (see for example He and Li (2007)) might be due to the long time
horizons used for modeling the trend chasing. In other words, trend chasing based
on short time horizons contributes to more realistic power-law behavior in volatil-
ity. Intuitively, technical analysis such as trend following strategy is mainly used
for short-term investment comparing to the fundamental analysis for long-term in-
vestment. Therefore the trend chasing based on short-time horizon contributes to
volatility in financial markets.
















(a) The ACs of the absolute returns



















(b) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure 5.4. The effect of the herding: the ACs of (a) the absolute
returns and (b) the squared returns based on 100 simulations with
τ = 16, β = 1, σF = 0.12, σM = 0.15 for v = 0.01, v = 0.1 and
v = 0.5.
5.3. The effect of the herding intensity. Secondly, we present in Fig. 5.4 the
effect of the herding on the AC patterns for the absolute returns (the left panel)
and the squared returns (the right panel), showing the contribution of the herding
to the power-law behavior in volatility. Similar to the effect of the time horizon, an
increase in the herding increases the level of the significant ACs for both the absolute
and squared returns. However, differently from the effect of the time horizon, the
ACs decay quickly under the herding.
5.4. The effect of the switching intensity. Thirdly, we present in Fig. 5.5 the
effect of the switching on the AC patterns for the absolute and squared returns. It
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(a) The ACs of the absolute returns


















(b) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure 5.5. The effect of the switching: the ACs of (a) the absolute
returns and (b) the squared returns based on 100 simulations with
v = 0.5, τ = 16, σF = 0.12, σM = 0.15 for β = 0.1, β = 0.5, β = 1
and β = 2.
shows that the switching contributes to the power-law behavior. Interestingly, and
differently from the effect of the time horizon and herding, the level of the significant
ACs for both the absolute and squared returns is not monotonic with respect to the
switching intensity β. The level increases significantly when β increases from 0.1
to 0.5, and then less significantly when β increases to 1, but decreases when β
increases further to 2. In particular, the ACs for the absolute returns decay very
quickly, comparing to the effect of the herding. This observation, together with
the discussion in Section 4.3, suggests that an increase in the switching can reduce
the return volatility and generate the power-law behavior at the same time. This
provides further support on the explanatory power of the adaptive switching in
financial markets initiated in Brock and Hommes (1998).
In summary, we have explored different mechanisms for the switching and the
herding behavior of agents on the market volatility and power-law behavior in par-
ticular. We show that both contribute to the power-law behavior, however the effect
is monotonically increasing with the herding, but not monotonic for the switching.
Finally, we investigate the question if pure herding is sufficient to explain the
power-law behavior by considering the case with σF = 0 and τ = 0. In this case, the
fundamental value becomes constant and the trend followers become naive traders
who take the current price as the expected future market price and hence do not
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(a) The ACs of the absolute returns


















(b) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure 5.6. The ACs of (a) the absolute returns and (b) the squared
returns based on 100 simulations with v = 0.5, τ = 0, σF = 0, σM =
0.15 for β = 0 and β = 1.















































Figure 5.7. The ACs of (a) the market returns; (b) the absolute
returns and (c) the squared returns based on 100 simulations with
τ = 0, β = 0, σF = 0, σM = 0.15 for v = 0.01, v = 0.1 and v = 0.5.
trade in the market anymore. Thus the market is driven by a pure herding mech-
anism. Fig. 5.6 illustrates the significant and decaying AC patterns in both the
absolute and squared returns, although the AC level for the squared returns is sig-
nificantly lower comparing to the cases discussed previously. Interestingly, there is
no significant difference in the AC patters of the absolute return between no switch-
ing (β = 0) and the switching (β = 1). This result is consistent with Alfarano et al.
(2005) who show that a pure herding model with fundamentalists and noise traders
can generate the power-law behavior. As a robustness check, we present Fig. 5.7
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with three different values of v. Similar to Fig. 5.4, we observe more significant AC
patterns as the herding parameter v increases.
Comparing to the AC patterns of the market indices in Fig. 5.1, we may argue
that the switching generates similar AC patterns to the NIKKEI 225 and the S&P
500 with quickly decaying AC patterns, while the herding generates similar AC
patterns to the DAX 30 and FTSE 300 with relatively slow decaying AC patterns.
This observation may suggest different market behaviors in different markets and
we leave this challenging empirical question to further stages of our research.
6. Conclusion
Market volatility is one of the most important features in financial markets and
the question is what drives it. To answer this question, the most obvious way is
to consider how agents behave in financial markets. Among various agents’ be-
haviors in financial markets, trend chasing, adaptive switching and herding are the
most important, well documented and studied in the empirical literature. This pa-
per incorporates these three behavioral elements into an asset pricing model in a
continuous-time framework and shows that they all contribute to market volatility
in different manners.
Most of the asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents are in discrete-time
framework focusing on trend chasing over short time horizon and adaptive switching.
Herding is commonly modelled by the master equation in a continuous-time setting.
Therefore the roles of trend chasing, switching and herding in market volatility have
been studied in separate frameworks. Within a continuous-time framework, this is
the first paper, to our knowledge, to combine trend chasing based on different time
horizon, switching and herding together to examine their roles on market volatility
in price and return. We show that both the herding and the trend chasing based on
long time horizon increase the fluctuations of the market price deviation from the
fundamental price and volatility of the market return. With respect to the switching,
they reduce the volatility in returns but leads to a “U”-shaped price volatility as
the switching intensity increases. Therefore herding and switching have an opposite
effect on return volatility.
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We also examine the explanatory power of the model in generating the power-law
behavior in return volatility. We show that, although the trend chasing, switching
and herding all contribute to the power-law behavior, the significant levels for the
ACs increase in the time horizon and herding, but an initial increase and then
decrease when the switching intensity increases. In addition, with herding, the
market noise plays an essential role in generating the power-law behavior.
The model proposed in this paper provides a unified framework to deal with trend
chasing, switching and herding in financial markets. The results provide some fur-
ther insights into possible different mechanisms for generating bubbles and crashes,
excess volatility and power-law behavior in volatility. Whether a particular market
is dominated by herding or switching is an empirical question that is left for future
research.
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Appendix A. Analytical solution for the master equation
We solve the master equation using the approximation method introduced by Aoki
(2002). Assume the fraction of fundamentalists in a given moment is determined by
its expected mean (m), the drift, and, an additive fluctuation component s of order







where s is a standard white noise. The asymptotically approximate solution of the
master equation is given by the system of coupled differential equations
dm
dt
= ζ(t)m− [ζ(t) + ξ(t)]m2,
∂Q
∂t










where Q(s, t) is the transition density function of the spread s at time t. The first
equation of (A.2) is a deterministic ordinary differential equation which displays
logistic dynamics for the trend. The second equation is a second order stochastic
partial differential equation, known as the Fokker-Planck equation that drives the
spread component (i.e. the fluctuations around the trend) of the probability flow.
By letting m equal to its steady state m∗ = ζ
ζ+ξ
, we have the distribution function
θ for the spread s, which is given by
θ(s) = Ce−
s2




which is a Gaussian density. Therefore, the two components of the dynamics of the
proportion of fundamentalists as represented by (A.1) are quantified. Accordingly
the evolution of the proportion of fundamentalists is given by the trend, described
by (A.2), plus a stochastic noise distributed according to (A.3). So we have (2.15).
For more details, we refer to Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011a).
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Appendix B. Definitions of the Parameters and Functions Used in
Proposition 3.1
The characteristic equation of the system (3.1) at the fundamental steady state
is given by13 ∆(λ) := (λ+ 2vn∗f)∆̃(λ) = 0, where










Note that equation (B.1) has the same form as the characteristic equation of the
model studied in He and Li (2012). Hence we can apply Proposition 3.1 in He and
Li (2012) to system (3.1). It follows that the stability of the steady state does not













That is, there is an upper bound on the time delay for stability change. The change
in stability happens only for τ ∈ [0, τ̃ ] if there exists a non-negative integer n such
that S+n (τ) = 0 or S
−
n (τ) = 0. Here
14
S±n (τ) = τ −
θ±(τ) + 2nπ
ω±(τ)












arccos(a4±), for a3± ≥ 0;
2π + arcsin(a3±), for a3± < 0, a4± ≥ 0;
2π − arccos(a4±), for a3± < 0, a4± < 0
and
a1 = k
2 + γ2f + γ
2
c − 2γfγc −
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−ω±(τ)(1− e−kτ)(k + γf − γc)
kγce−kτ











τ ∈ (0, τ̃ ] | ∃n ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }, S+n (τ) = 0 or S−n (τ) = 0
}}
.
13Interestingly, the time delays τf , τc introduced in the performance measures in (2.9) do not
appear in the characteristic equation, hence they do not affect the local stability and bifurcation
analysis. This is due to the fact that they are in higher order terms and they affect the nonlinear
dynamics, rather than the dynamics of the linearized system.
14We refer to Theorem 3.3 in He et al. (2009) for the properties of functions S±n (τ).
HERDING, TREND CHASING, AND MARKET VOLATILITY 35
Appendix C. Comparison to the HL model and Nonlinear Effect of
Herding
To examine the effect of herding, we present the corresponding results of no-
herding model in He and Li (2012), the HL model. Unless specified otherwise, we
choose the parameter values k = 0.05, µ = 1, βf = 1.4, βc = 1.4, Cf = 0.05,
Cc = 0.03, ηf = 0.5, ηc = 0.6, τf = 10, τc = 5, and F̄ = 1.
(a) Price bifurcation in τ (b) Price bifurcation in β











(c) Phase plot of Uf and nf
Figure C.1. (a) The bifurcation of the market prices with respect
to τ with β = 1; (b) The bifurcation of market price with respect to β
with τ = 8; (c) The phase plot of the relationship between the fitness
Uf and the market fraction nf with τ = 16 and β = 1 for HL model.















(a) Time series of P and nf










(b) Phase plot of (P, nf )
Figure C.2. (a) The time series of the market prices P (t) (the blue
solid line) and the market fraction nf (t) of fundamentalists (the green
dash dot line) and (b) the phase plot of (P (t), nf(t)).
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(a) Price bifurcation













(b) Phase plot of (P, nf )
Figure C.3. (a) The bifurcation diagram of the market prices with
respect to τ for model (3.1) and (b) the corresponding phase plot of
(P (t), nf(t)). Here v = 0.1 and τ = 16.
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Appendix D. Price Volatility Comparison to the HL Model
This appendix presents some results from the HL model and price volatility of
the herding model.

















(a) Prices for τ = 3

















(b) Prices for τ = 16
















(c) Price deviation density for τ = 3
















(d) Price deviation density for τ = 16
Figure D.1. The time series of the fundamental price F (t) (the blue
dotted line) and the market prices P (t) (the red solid line) with (a)
τ = 3 and (b) τ = 16, and the distributions of the deviations of the
market prices from the fundamental prices P (t)−F (t) with (c) τ = 3
and (d) τ = 16 for the HL model. Here σF = 0.12 and σM = 0.15.
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(a) Market fraction for τ = 3













(b) Market fraction for τ = 16
















(c) Market fraction density for τ = 3
















(d) Market fraction density for τ = 16
Figure D.2. The time series of the fractions of the fundamentalists
with (a) τ = 3 and (b) τ = 16 and the corresponding distributions
with (c) τ = 3 and (d) τ = 16 for the HL model. Here σF = 0.12 and
σM = 0.15.
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Appendix E. Noises and the Stylized Facts
This appendix presents the time series properties and AC patterns of the return,
absolute return, and squared return of the model with both the market and funda-
mental noises in Fig. E.1, the market noise only in Fig. E.2, and the fundamental
noise only in Fig. E.3.
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(a) The market price and the fundamental
price










(b) The market returns (r)













(c) The density of the market returns













(d) The ACs of the market returns










(e) The ACs of the absolute returns









(f) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure E.1. The effect of the two noises: the time series of (a) the
market price (red solid line) and the fundamental price (blue dotted
line) and (b) the market returns; (c) the return distribution; the ACs
of (d) the returns; (e) the absolute returns, and (f) the squared returns.
Here σF = 0.12 and σM = 0.15.
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(a) The market price and the fundamental
price










(b) The market returns (r)
















(c) The density of the market returns












(d) The ACs of the market returns














(e) The ACs of the absolute returns












(f) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure E.2. The effect of the market noise only: the time series
of (a) the market price (red solid line) and the fundamental price
(blue dotted line) and (b) the market returns; (c) the return distribu-
tion; the ACs of (d) the returns; (e) the absolute returns, and (f) the
squared returns. Here σF = 0 and σM = 0.15.
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(a) The market price and the fundamental
price


































(c) The density of the market returns













(d) The ACs of the market returns














(e) The ACs of the absolute returns









(f) The ACs of the squared returns
Figure E.3. The effect of the fundamental noise only: the time se-
ries of (a) the market price (red solid line) and the fundamental price
(blue dotted line) and (b) the market returns; (c) the return distribu-
tion; the ACs of (d) the returns; (e) the absolute returns, and (f) the
squared returns. Here σF = 0.12 and σM = 0.
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